By Erik F. Nelson.
Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2024.
ISBN 978-1-60635-480-3. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index.
Pp. 384. $39.95.
It was a logical plan that Major General Joseph Hooker formulated for his spring 1863 campaign. His command, the Army of the Potomac, 134,000 strong, would execute a bold double envelopment against General Robert E. Lee’s 60,000-man Army of Northern Virginia, strung out along the Rappahannock River, just below Fredericksburg to the east and twelve miles to the west of that town. “My plans are perfect,” Hooker boasted,” and when I start to carry them-out, may God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.”
The Union Army rolled forward on 27 April 1863 with three infantry corps crossing the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers to strike the enemy’s left flank, while two infantry corps crossed the Rappahannock just south of Fredericksburg to storm the Confederate right. In addition, a Federal cavalry corps was unleashed to harass the Rebel rear to sever all supply and communications between Lee’s army and Richmond. Hooker expected Lee to abandon his fortified position on the Rappahannock and fall back to Richmond while vigorously pursued. If the Rebels elected not to retreat, Hooker surmised Lee would have to attack his army outnumbered and on unfavorable ground.
While the Army of the Potomac’s main thrust at Chancellorsville, and Lee’s brilliant riposte during 1-2 May has taken center stage in the studies regarding the Chancellorsville Campaign, the lesser-known engagements at and just west of Fredericksburg affected the main event significantly.This becomes clear in Erik F. Nelson’s The Forgotten Battles of the Chancellorsville Campaign: Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford in Spring 1863.
Nelson is a former U.S. Navy weapons specialist and retired city planner of Fredericksburg, Virginia. He was a founding member of the Central Virginia Battlefields Trust and a founding editor of its journal, Fredericksburg History and Biography.
Nelson’s employment of a very impressive array of primary and secondary sources indicates a thorough and exhausting research effort. The sources used allow reader to follow, in almost minute detail, the movements and actions of the Union and Confederate forces during 1 May through the 5 May, the time frame in which the actions at Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks Ford took place. Some chapters go as far as dividing the day under discussion into morning, afternoon, and night depending upon how important the events of that day were.
The accounts of the command decisions made and the fighting waged as a result of those decisions at the three contests featured in the book range from corps, division, brigade, regiment, and battery level. The first-person accounts of combat are riveting and are presented in a clear and succinct narrative.
Nelson does not confine his analysis just to the battles, which are the main subjects of his work, but looks beyond the conclusion of the Chancellorsville Campaign. For example, he records the blame game Hooker actively engaged in to deflect responsibility for the Union defeat at Chancellorsville. Not content to take a swipe at Major General Otis O. Howard’s ill-fated XI Corps for its part in the campaign, Nelson also records how Hooker attempted to hold Major General John Sedgwick liable for the Federal loss at Chancellorsville. This accusation rings hollow considering Sedgwick’s VI Corps achieved the sole Union victory (Fredericksburg) of the entire campaign. Supported by well-done maps, Nelson’s study is a worthwhile addition to an overlooked chapter of the Chancellorsville Campaign.
Arnold Blumberg
Baltimore, Maryland